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How 2400 pages of tech industrial policy will change 
transatlantic relations  
Tobias Gehrke
The currently 2400-page long ‘US Innovation and 
Competition Act’ making its way through Congress is 
about one thing only: China. But it also signals a much 
broader shift in American geoeconomic strategy 
towards tech industrial policy which matters just as 
much for Europe. To avoid major rifts, tech industrial 
diplomacy will need to become a staple of transatlantic 
affairs. 
 
THE ENDLESS FRONTIER?  
 “When future generations of Americans cast 
their gaze toward new frontiers, will they see a red 
flag planted on those new frontiers that is not our 
own?”, asked Todd Young, Republican Senator 
and co-sponsor of the landmark bill passed by a 
bipartisan US Senate in June. “Today, we answer 
unequivocally, ‘No.’”  
Few Europeans will still be aghast at such 
jingoism out of Washington, a city which today 
almost unequivocally embraces ideas of an 
undeterred and ideological Chinese challenge to 
US supremacy. The US Innovation and Competition 
Act (USICA), which still awaits House approval 
but is expected to pass, is hailed as Washington’s 
most important piece of legislation to win this all-
out competition. It folds six different bills into 
one, 2400-page long mega bill. Together with 
Biden’s $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan proposal, 
which includes items worth some $325 billion in 
new R&D funding for emerging technologies, 
these bills represent a bold geoeconomic push to 
boost American innovation and tech leadership 
in face of Chinese advances. A praiseworthy aim. 
But while China is the target, Europe may equally 
stand to lose. Tech industrial diplomacy is now 
urgently needed to impede this scenario.  
DON’T CALL ME BY MY NAME 
previously ineffable term, USICA screams of it: 
industrial policy is back in fashion. China (and, to a 
lesser degree, climate change) have made the 
seemingly impossible possible. Even the 
Republican right, long the nominal torch-bearer 
of free market capitalism, now cautions that the 
“perils of free-market fundamentalism” can be 
“at odds with the common good and the national 
interest” (to counter China, naturally). Across the 
aisle, China has become a bipartisan bridge over 
age-old economic policy divides. “We should be 
clear-eyed that the idea of an open, free-market 
global economy ignores the reality that China and 
 
 





other countries are playing by a different set of 
rules,” Biden’s Director of the National Economic 
Council Brian Deese recently cautioned. Texan 
Republican Senator John Cornyn meanwhile 
conceded that “frankly, I think China has left us 
no option but to make these investments.” 
USICA, which started as a bipartisan proposal for 
an Endless Frontier Act – in homage to Vannevar 
Bush’s pivotal report Science: The Endless Frontier 
to President Roosevelt in 1945 which pleaded for 
a major expansion of government support for 
science, research and innovation – was bold. The 
bill called for a $100 billion investment into a new 
Technology Directorate at the National Science 
Foundation which would fund research and 
science in cutting-edge emerging technologies. 
An autonomous and flexible Technology 
Directorate, so the idea, would serve as a central 
node between industry and academia with clear, 
mission-driven research goals and unlock a new 
technological revolution in the service of great 
power competition – just as Vannevar Bush’s 
Office of Scientific Research and Development had been 
when shepherding research into war-winning 
technologies (including the Manhattan project).  
It has been an uphill battle since. As it stands, less 
than $40 billion in new spending was agreed for 
USICA, with less than $10 billion for actual R&D 
and only some $4 billion for the Technology 
Directorate’s core R&D efforts. Many critics 
warn of a dangerous politicisation of America’s 
science policy – the opposite of the initial idea. 
The size and political importance of the bill also 
made it amazingly vulnerable to lobby interests: 
banning the sale of shark fins, for example, made 
it into the bill (to also win the culinary ethics 
competition with China, supposedly).  
Still, despite being watered down significantly, 
USICA’s big-ticket item has so far weathered the 
storm: a $52 billion program to boost 
semiconductor manufacturing in the US, the 
critical technology at the centre of geoeconomic 
competition. Together with additional R&D 
funding sought by the Biden administration to 
spur climate-relevant technologies and leverage 
federal procurement to jumpstart clean energy 
manufacturing, tech industrial policy has become 
a primary deliverable of the new US 
administration. While some initiatives and ideas 
were seeded during the Trump years, it is the 
Biden administration’s recovery plans, boost of 
the Pentagon’s R&D budget, and the USICA 
which fully anchor them at the heart of US 
geoeconomic strategy. Above all, they mark a 
fork in the road for the intimacy in the 
relationship between the state, technology, and 
national security. 
 TO KNOW YOUR ENEMY… 
Such intimacy is well known among Beijing’s 
political elites to whom national technological 
capacity – and the absence of foreign dependence 
– has been the linchpin of China’s sovereign 
futures. Ever since Mao’s Two Bombs, One Satellite 
project (1958), Chinese leaders have been 
nurturing industrial and technological pet 
projects of epic proportions. “It isn’t a matter 
about which we can afford to be near-sighted,” 
Deng Xiaoping explained his grand technological 
ambitions in 1988. “China cannot afford to fall 
behind. China cannot afford not to be engaged, 
despite of the fact that we are poor.” Most 
prominently, for over four decades Beijing has 
been pouring billions of dollars into its 
semiconductor manufacturing capacity. With 
some $300 billion worth of chip imports 
annually, China’s vulnerability is, unsurprisingly, 
of great concern to Beijing’s geoeconomically-
minded leaders. But its tech industrial plans for 
domestic semiconductor capacity have had mixed 
 
 





results at best – a fact which has not stopped 
Beijing from committing ever more resources to 
this strategic effort.  
For the past three decades, America and Europe 
concentrated (more or less) on curbing the worst 
excesses of China’s industrial policies. Stricter 
and better enforceable rules through multilateral 
institutions (WTO) or bilateral deals were the 
default effort (and remain key). But these efforts 
have more recently been flanked by a number of 
unilateral tools: screening foreign acquisitions of 
advanced tech companies, sanctioning Chinese 
companies and individuals, restricting exports of 
sensitive technologies, cracking down on R&D 
espionage, and purging digital networks, 
infrastructures, and technologies from Chinese 
suppliers, to name a few.  
Now, though, tech industrial policy is the craze in 
the West itself. To retain manufacturing 
capabilities, raw material supplies, and technology 
assets considered crucial for economic and 
national security, governments are embracing 
schemes long considered to undermine, not 
support, economic and national security. 
“Strategic public investments to shelter and grow 
champion industries is a reality of the twenty-
first-century economy. We cannot ignore or wish 
this away,” NEC Director Brian Deese explained 
the change of heart. Notwithstanding 
appeasements that America’s tech industrial 
policy is different to that of China’s, the irony is 
not lost on anyone: Washington policymakers 
may well heed Sun Tzu’s advice to his readers in 
The Art of War, often misquoted in English as: 
“To know your enemy is to become your enemy.” 
 
 
BIRDS OF A FEATHER 
The United States is of course far from alone in 
this shift. USICA pales next to South Korea’s 
pledge to funnel $451 billion of (public and 
private) investments into its domestic 
semiconductor capacity. Japan wants to reclaim 
lost ground too, while Singapore hope to capture 
new ground and Taiwan will not stand idle in 
preserving its lion’s share of the cake. The EU, 
meanwhile, wants to double its share in global 
semiconductor production (to 20%) by 2030. 
How the Commission wants to achieve its goal 
(what targets, which subsidies?) amid this serious 
geoeconomic competition still remains unclear.  
And it’s not only about semiconductors. Across 
the continent, new regional and national tech 
industrial plans outline ambitious targets, from 
digital connectivity, AI, green energy, cloud 
services, and quantum computing, driven not 
least by fears of missing the boat for a sovereign 
future. Paris and Berlin, for example, pledged in 
a 2019 joint manifesto that “we will only succeed 
if we are the ones creating, developing and 
producing new technologies,” before promising 
to “massively invest in innovation.”  
The European Commission, for its part, has been 
busy with sketching the contours of an EU 
industrial strategy. In its most recent update, the 
Commission wants industrial policy to target 
climate neutrality, Covid-19 recovery, resilience 
of critical supply chains, and reduction of foreign 
dependencies – a rather ambitious laundry list 
from an institution with comparatively few 
resources of its own (notwithstanding the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RFF)).  
The Berlaymont is therefore particularly concerned 
with tying together national efforts in Important 
Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI), a 
mechanism which grants private-public 
partnerships in multi-country projects more lax 
 
 





rules on state aid (for subsidies). It also collects 
data about emerging needs and possible 
bottlenecks for technological breakthroughs. 
Beyond the RFF, its strongest instrument may be 
its research funds with a €95 billion budget for 
the next seven years. It includes, for example, a 
new €10 billion strong European Innovation Council 
(EIC) which aims to provide grants and take 
equity in European start-ups in the riskiest R&D 
fields. Too little say several EU tech bosses who 
rally for a €100 billion Sovereign EU Tech Fund as 
necessary to break Europe’s “quasi-absolute tech 
dependency.” Just as in the US, tech industrial 
policy is moving into full swing across the EU.  
HORNIG’S GHOST 
European fear of losing a tech race against both 
America and China made serious inroads. These 
fears are eerily reminiscent of the technology gap 
debate gripping the continent in the 1960s, when 
leading politicians from British PM Harold 
Wilson to German Minister of Finance Franz 
Josef Strauß and Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre 
Harmel were alarmed that a growing tech gap 
would put European sovereignty at risk. 
America’s Johnson administration was convinced 
that the actual problem was only partly 
technological but also “psychological, political, 
economic, and social.” Europe’s dilemma, as they 
saw it, was the desire to “benefit to the maximum 
extent from US technological advances while 
avoiding the possibility of American 
technological/industrial domination.” 
Still, Johnson chose to engage European fears by 
appointing his science & tech advisor Donald F. 
Hornig in 1967 to create the Interdepartmental 
Committee on the Technological Gap. The “Hornig 
Committee” would recommend to Johnson that 
European concerns must be taken seriously: 
“The US should try to convert European 
resentment about the technological gap into a 
constructive source of support for greater intra-
European cooperation […] and attempt to ensure 
an outward-looking Europe which will be a 
strong force in the world economy,” for example 
by promoting R&D cooperation and stressing the 
joint stakes in technological progress.  
Today, a time when innovation and technological 
advances rely ever more heavily on international 
collaboration, Hornig’s advice is even more 
pressing. Enlisting like-minded countries for 
common tech industrial goals must become a 
priority of any strategy, not an afterthought to it.  
TECH INDUSTRIAL DIPLOMACY 
The groundwork has been laid. The newly minted EU-US Trade 
and Technology Council (TTC) offers a broad 
platform to coordinate tech industrial policies. 
Finding concrete projects is now of urgency. For 
example, Tyson Barker of the DGAP recently 
proposed a EU-US joint venture chip production 
consortium across the entire value chain with 
financial support to European participating firms 
coming from the RRF. Similar ventures could be 
conceived for hydrogen energy and batteries, 
where the EU is already developing IPCEIs and 
industrial alliances. Increasing the stakes of US 
companies in EU tech industrial projects (e.g., 
IPCEIs) should be mirrored by equal measures 
for EU companies in the US – to share benefits 
and to maximise the effects of collective standard 
setting.  
Equally important is to identify emerging 
technology challenges where common R&D 
efforts could strengthen the transatlantic 
innovation economy. In the case of critical raw 
minerals, for example, the partners could pool 
R&D resources to advance sustainable mining 
and processing technologies as well as recycling 
and substitution processes, which could enhance 
supply security down the road. This could also 
 
 





strengthen other critical mineral initiatives, such 
as the Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials inked 
with Canada in June. 
Both should also work to align standards on 
research security, an issue of growing concern in the 
US (in USICA) and in the EU. Setting common 
R&D cooperation standards (e.g., openness, 
reciprocity, IP protections) and co-developing 
strong deterrence and enforcement tools against 
IP and cyber theft, for instance, could not only 
strengthen the capacity to deliver the benefits of 
tech industrial policies, but also allow (continued) 
R&D cooperation with China based on fair and 
enforceable standards.  
In 1966, Italian Foreign Minister Amintore 
Fanfani called on his Washington colleagues to 
establish a “technological Marshall Plan” among 
NATO members in which they would cooperate 
on the high-tech areas of the time. Fifty-five years 
on, the Trade and Technology Council could become 
just that. But only if tech industrial policy moves 
into heart of diplomacy. 
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